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ABSTRACT

This paper asserts that in the United States, states and large school districts are turning to a relatively new policy strategy, know as "reconstitution," for addressing the conditions of low-performing schools. The strategy centers around the notion of vacating the adults from a school building and starting over. The underlying question is whether reconstituted schools show long-lasting gains in student achievement. This paper explores the history and underlying theory of reconstitution as designed and implemented in the San Francisco (California) unified school district throughout the last 15 years, with a particular focus on how school communities have experienced the policy. The study points out that, having reconstituted 16 schools in 15 years, San Francisco is the seasoned veteran when it comes to reconstitution. It undertakes three tasks: (1) determines what the San Francisco Unified School District expects to achieve by employing the policy of reconstitution--that is, identifying and understanding its underlying "theories of action"; (2) offers a general theory of effective accountability, drawing on recent literature related to performance-based accountability; and (3) examines a series of recent political and policy changes related to reconstitution. The paper suggests that the experiences of San Francisco schools can illuminate a number of issues critical to the effectiveness of accountability initiatives. Contains a table, notes, references, taped interviews, and attachments that deal with philosophical tenets; indicators to identify low-performing schools; consent decree implementation; process of reconstitution in San Francisco; San Francisco's goals; and criteria used to identify schools for reconstitution. (BT)

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Reconstitution in Theory and Practice: The Experience of San Francisco

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Introduction

Across the country, states and large school districts are turning to a relatively new policy strategy for addressing the conditions of low-performing schools. Embedded in a larger shift toward holding schools accountable for measured performance, the strategy centers around the notion of vacating the adults from a school building and starting over. In many settings, the policy is known as "reconstitution." The cities of San Francisco, Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, Portland, Atlanta, Cleveland, Houston, as well as Kentucky and Maryland have all embraced the idea in some form. However, these reconstitution policies vary on a number of important dimensions: the level and nature of support given to schools, the design and implementation of school improvement plans, job protection for teachers removed from a school, and the criteria used to identify failing schools are a few examples.

Given the swift rise of reconstitution as a policy tool, and given the dramatic nature of the policy, it is surprising how little we know about the efficacy of reconstitution. Do reconstituted schools show long-lasting gains in student achievement? Do schools *threatened* with reconstitution manage to improve and thus avoid the imposition of sanctions? Under what conditions does improvement become more likely? These are some of the questions awaiting empirical responses.

This paper has the much more modest goal of exploring the history and underlying theory of reconstitution as designed and implemented in San Francisco over the last fifteen years, with a particular focus on how school communities have experienced the policy. Having reconstituted sixteen schools in the last decade and a half, San Francisco is the seasoned veteran when it comes to reconstitution. As such, the experiences of San Francisco schools can illuminate a number of issues critical to the effectiveness of accountability initiatives.

Reconstitution in San Francisco

In 1982, the San Francisco Unified School District (the District or SFUSD) reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit that sought to desegregate San Francisco's public schools. That settlement was embodied in a consent decree approved by Judge William Orrick of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco NAACP v. SFUSD (Consent Decree) 1983). The Consent Decree has two stated objectives: (1) "To eliminate racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in any SFUSD school, program, or

classroom and to achieve the broadest practicable distribution throughout the system of students from the racial and ethnic groups which comprise the student enrollment of the SFUSD" (Consent Decree, par. 12); and (2) "to achieve academic excellence throughout the SFUSD" (Par. 39). To enhance student achievement in the largely African American Bayview-Hunters Point area of the District, the Consent Decree also provided the District substantial and unprecedented powers to reconstitute the schools in Bayview-Hunters Point.

In Bayview-Hunters Point in particular and San Francisco in general, reconstitution came to consist of eight components: (1) vacating the adults and hiring new staff committed to the Consent Decree's vision; (2) implementing a set of philosophical tenets drawn up by the District (see Attachment A); (3) implementing delineated student outcomes; (4) providing technology-rich environments; (5) encouraging flexibility in adult-student ratios; (6) providing staff development associated with items 1, 2, & 3; (7) selecting an instructional focus; and (8) involving parents. According to the District, to reconstitute a school in San Francisco means implementing all eight components (SFUSD 1997).

In 1992, an expert panel appointed by the Court found that the District had, for the most part, achieved the first of its two Consent Decree goals, but had failed to achieve academic excellence for all students in the District and had particularly failed to improve the academic achievement of African-American and Hispanic students (Orfield, et al. 1992). The panel found, however, that the policy of reconstitution in the Bayview-Hunters Point area appreciably enhanced the achievement of the students in those schools, many of whom were African-American. Thus, the panel recommended and the Court approved and ordered the expansion of the reconstitution policy to all schools suffering high levels of low achievement. Under Superintendent Waldemar "Bill" Rojas, whose tenure began in 1992, the District has aggressively pursued reconstitution as a means of raising student achievement.

Mapping the Paper

In this paper, we undertake three tasks. First, we attempt to determine what the San Francisco Unified School District expects to achieve by employing the policy of reconstitution – that is, identifying and understanding its underlying *theories of action*. This task is significant because the theory of action appears to shift in several important ways over the policy's history. Reconstitution began as a remedy for past racial segregation and school failure. Premised on the

idea that the school's organization (its staff and administrative composition) was the source of its inability to provide quality educational services to students, vacating the staff served to create a new organization. Later, the District used reconstitution as an incentive to induce school improvement. Schools that were performing poorly, it was presumed, would respond to the threat of reconstitution by taking steps to improve student achievement.[1] Once we identify the appropriate theories of action, we evaluate the degree to which they have worked in San Francisco. Second, we offer a general theory of effective accountability, drawing on recent literature related to performance-based accountability. This framework is used to evaluate the experiences of San Francisco schools faced with reconstitution. Third, we examine a series of recent political and policy changes related to reconstitution. These changes, which include an agreement with the teachers' union to bolster support for new teachers and additional resources for principals in reconstituted schools, respond to some of the issues we raise about the policy and may, in fact, reflect a new conception of accountability and teacher policy in the District.

Methodology

We have employed a case study methodology consisting of several types of data: semi-structured interviews with teachers, union leaders, community members and several District officials, including all of the officials responsible for reviewing low performing schools and making decisions about reconstitution. Given the limited number of teachers and community members interviewed, we do not report their responses as representative of all teachers in the District and we recognize the need for further research based on more intensive data collection at this level. We have also reviewed primary documents and other written materials as well as longitudinal student achievement data from the District.

Theories of Action

Reconstitution as Remedy for Organizational Failure: The Genesis of the Policy

Under the 1983 Consent Decree and in the context of the 1992 expert panel's report, reconstitution is seen as a remedy – both an equitable legal remedy to compensate African American and Latino children for past racial and ethnic segregation and a policy remedy to rescue failing schools. In this section, we discuss the theory and application of reconstitution as remedy.

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[1] We are indebted to Jennifer O'Day for the general insight that reconstitution policies are variously intended to serve as remedies, incentives, and political symbols. O'Day developed this typology in a presentation at the 1997 AERA Annual Meeting in Chicago.

Theory of Action: Reconstitution as Remedy

Reconstitution as a remedy targets an organization that, on some measure of effectiveness, displays persistent failure. In the case of schools, reconstitution targets schools that suffer from persistent, low student achievement. The cause of this failure *is not* considered to be some environmental or external force, but rather, failure *is* caused by internal/organizational factors.[2] Some have argued that such failure is intractable because it is a part of the organizational culture – the assumptions, shared beliefs, meanings and values of an organization (Rojas 1996). Because the source of failure is internal to the organization, reconstitution will remove the source of failure and breathe new life into the organization. With a new administration, faculty, and staff who share a common vision of school improvement, with adherence to a new system of assumptions, beliefs, meanings and values, with outcome-based learning, and with staff development focused on student performance, the school can be "rebuilt." As a result of this rebuilding process, student achievement will improve.

Our research suggests that those who crafted and implemented the policy of reconstitution as remedy believed that the Bayview-Hunters Point schools had failed and that the source of the failure was internal. Some suggested that the faculty and administration in those schools did not believe they could raise student achievement in the schools and acted accordingly. Another respondent said that "everyone" agreed that the only way to improve those schools was to bring in fresh faces. Thus, reconstitution-as-remedy posits that the failure of a school is caused by an irreversible internal problem that can only be cured by vacating the adults from the organization and starting anew with a plan centered on student achievement.

Theory Applied: Reconstitution in Practice

The reconstitution policy in the District is the product of a three-decade effort to provide educational equity and excellence to all San Francisco children through desegregation and the philosophy that all children can learn. The Consent Decree that resulted from the desegregation litigation in San Francisco accordingly had the ambitious twin goals of desegregating (or, more accurately, integrating) a racially and ethnically diverse student body and ensuring academic excellence for all of San Francisco's children. Merely counting and mixing bodies was (and is)

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2 For several discussions of this distinction and a further elaboration on the internal and external causes of failure, see Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten 1988; McKelvey 1988; Whetten 1980.

not enough for the Court and the District – elimination of segregation requires academic excellence for all students. This legally mandated link between desegregation and academic achievement remains rare in large, urban districts.[3]

To achieve the goal of academic excellence, the Consent Decree provides the District with certain unique reform tools (Consent Decree 1983). Most ambitious was the Consent Decree's package of provisions for revitalizing the racially isolated, allegedly low-achieving Bayview-Hunters Point schools (Par. 17). First, the Consent Decree set forth a plan to convert most of the schools in the Bayview-Hunters Point area into magnet schools or special schools with enriched programs.[4] Second, the Consent Decree required the District to conduct a public relations campaign to dispel negative public stereotypes regarding the Bayview-Hunters Point area. As a part of that campaign, the District published and distributed to parents of all school-aged children in the District a description of the new programs in the area's schools; retained a public relations firm to promote the neighborhood generally and the schools specifically; and actively recruited students from throughout the District to attend the area's schools (Par. 31). Third, the Consent Decree provided the District with the radical tool of vacating the adults from the school site to attain improvement in student achievement in six schools (the four schools identified in footnote 3 plus Martin Luther King Middle School and Horace Mann Middle School):

> The S.F.U.S.D. shall declare all staff and administrative positions in the Bayview-Hunters Point schools open, *and shall reconstitute the staff and administration of those schools on the basis of a desegregation plan developed by S.F.U.S.D.* and submitted to the Court. . . . The plan shall provide for the assignment of administrators who are strong instructional leaders, with sufficient administrative support (Par. 18, emphasis supplied).

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[3] To achieve the goal of desegregation, the Consent Decree requires the District to maintain in each school no fewer than four of the nine identified racial/ethnic groups. The District must further ensure that no more than 45 % of the population of any "regular" school is comprised of any single racial/ethnic group, while "alternative" schools may have no more than 40 % of their student bodies made up of any single racial/ethnic group. The District's "alternative" schools are either academic magnet schools or special schools with enriched programs focusing on certain types of instructions. Those schools are Argonne, Buena Vista, Clarendon, Douglass, John Swett, Lakeshore, Lawton, Lilienthal, New Traditions, Rooftop, SF Community, Alice Fong Yu, and Yick Wo Elementary Schools; Lawton and SF Community Middle Schools; and ISA, Lowell, SOTA, and Wallenberg High Schools. The remainder of the District's schools are "regular" schools (SFUSD 1996).

[4] The Charles R. Drew Elementary School established a magnet Early Childhood Development Center; the Dr. George Washington Carver Elementary School purportedly became a "model school" after 1989 (but was supposed to have become an academic school); Sir Francis Drake Elementary School (now known as Malcolm X Elementary School) was enriched to place an emphasis on computer instruction; and Burton High School implemented an "academically rigorous" program to attract students (Pars. 17-30, as modified).

The overhaul of the six Bayview-Hunters Point schools is what has come to be known as "Phase One" of the District's implementation of the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree not only provided additional funds and directives regarding enriched programs, it also granted the District a year to plan the implementation of the Phase One reforms. In sum, four schools were reconstituted and two schools – King and Burton – were newly created in Phase One. The Consent Decree also requires annual monitoring and reporting on progress toward objectives (Par. 15).

In addition to the specific Consent Decree provisions for revitalizing Bayview-Hunters Point, the District also adopted the Philosophical Tenets to guide itself toward the twin goals of diversity and excellence. Drafted by the Assistant Superintendent for the Department of Integration and his staff, the Philosophical Tenets reflect essential characteristics of a school committed to achieving academic excellence for all.[5]

Beginning in 1983 and continuing to 1992, the District implemented the Consent Decree with occasional, but relatively limited, Court intervention. Beside the implementation of the Phase One reforms, the District also targeted 16 additional schools for Consent Decree funds and intervention. The District targeted those schools based upon 17 indicators that were intended to measure whether a school was failing.[6] In Phase Two of the implementation (February 1986), 3 schools were targeted, in Phase Three (July 1986), 8 schools were targeted, while in Phase Four (1989), 5 schools were targeted.[7] All 16 targeted schools were dubbed "Consent Decree schools" and received substantial Consent Decree funds, but none received the full panoply of reforms that the Bayview-Hunters Point schools received. Particularly, in none of the schools were the adults vacated and none received systematic guidance from the District as to how the money should be spent to create better performing schools. Some District officials and teachers have criticized the District and its administration for simply throwing Consent Decree funds at those schools without providing them with sufficient direction as to how to improve student performance. Indeed, some believe that a former assistant superintendent used the Consent Decree funds in Phases Three and Four as pork to further his/her political position, rather than to improve the District's schools.

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5 For a complete list of the District's Philosophical Tenets, see Attachment A.

6 For a list of those 17 indicators, see Attachment B.

7 For a list of schools in Phases One through Four, please see Attachment C.

During that same time period, however, the District vacated the adults at two other schools – James Lick and John Muir – but did not provide those schools with the tools to develop the six additional educational concepts that the Phase One schools enjoyed. Significantly, Lick and Muir did not have a year to plan for their transition – both were reconstituted in a single summer (1988). As discussed below, Lick and Muir ultimately failed to show student achievement gains.

Table 1 shows the District's intervention in schools under the Consent Decree. Schools targeted for resources and interventions in the legal agreement are marked with an "*" next to their name in the table. The first column indicates the reconstitution (or opening) of the "Phase One" schools in 1983, followed five years later by the vacating of the staffs from Lick and Muir.

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Theory Assessed: Can Reconstitution Work as a Remedy?

This section reviews evidence on the question of whether reconstitution worked as a remedy for racial segregation and poor achievement in the Phase One/Bayview-Hunters Point schools. In 1992, the Federal District Court appointed a panel of experts to review the record of the District over the preceding eight years and assess the District's progress. Chaired by Professor Gary Orfield, the expert panel issued a report to the court in 1992 concluding that although the District had largely met its desegregation goals:

> the District has not realized the goals for academic achievement for the overwhelming majority of African American and Hispanic students in the critical areas of educational attainment, dropouts, special education placement, and suspensions from school (Orfield, et al. 1992, p. 1).

Analyzing average student scores in reading, language arts, and math on the California Test of Basic Skills (CTBS), the panel specifically found that "achievement trends show[] that the racial gaps remain very large, that they deeply affect African American and Hispanic students, and that they become worse after elementary school" (p. 29). The CTBS scores also showed that African American and Hispanic students, as groups, remained far below District and national norms from first through twelfth grades (p. 30). Clearly SFUSD has not achieved academic excellence for all.

Despite that grim finding, the expert panel also found that the efforts to revitalize the schools in the Bayview-Hunters Point area had succeeded.[8] The "success" the panel found was relative to certain other schools within the District: compared to African Americans in non-Phase One District schools receiving Consent Decree funds, African-Americans in the Bayview-Hunters Point elementary schools enjoyed higher average CTBS scores, lower retention rates, and lower attrition rates.[9] The success was also relative to pre-Consent Decree performance: the Bayview-Hunters Point elementary schools improved students achievement and lowered their retention and attrition rates. The nature and magnitude of the achievement gains were not reported, however. The panel's finding of improvement in the Phase One Schools is further buttressed by the fact that, in the years since reconstitution was again embraced as a policy in 1993, none of the Phase One schools has been placed on probation for poor performance (see the discussion in the following section and Table 1).

The panel attributed the "success" in Phase One to several factors, including, among other things, a commitment to staff development and individual learning, and the injection of resources focused upon enhanced academic programs (Orfield, et al. 1992). According to the panel, however, a crucial ingredient in the improvement of the Bayview-Hunters point schools was vacating the adults from those schools and starting anew. The panel supported that claim by pointing to the fact that "[t]he Consent Decree provided a number of . . . District schools with hundreds of thousands of extra dollars each year to implement programs seen as necessary at the school level without reconstituting the existing staff" (p. 35). The panel noted that each non-Phase One Consent Decree school received a large annual increase in budget with wide discretion

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[8] The expert panel also found that African-American students from the Bayview-Hunters Point area who transferred to "middle-class" schools under the Consent Decree's Optional Enrollment Request (OER) process performed higher than African-American students in both Phase One and non-Phase One Consent Decree schools. This result may have been due to a self-selection bias as the more motivated students and their parents took the opportunity to transfer to what they perceived to be better schools, or it may have been due to the desegregation effect some have found of mixing low-income minority students with middle-class non-minority students (See, e.g., Crain & Mahard 1981; Mahard & Crain 1983).

[9] It should be noted that an earlier evaluation report (Guthrie, Palmquist, Roy, Woo, Yanez, and Liao 1988) found that three Phase Two middle schools (James Lick, Potrero Hill, and Visitacion Valley) performed as consistently as the Phase One middle schools – Horace Mann and Martin Luther King, Jr. – in elevating student performance in mathematics. Specifically, that evaluation report found that the grade equivalency gain scores of the Phase Two middle schools on the mathematics portion of the CTBS were "generally the equal of Phase I schools" (p. x). Thus, one cannot conclude that the Phase One schools uniformly outperformed the other Consent Decree schools in terms of "value added." However, the report noted that the "Phase II schools' absolute CTBS scores remain well below the Phase I, district, and state averages" (p. 21, n. 16 and Appendix A, Table A.11).

to use it to improve schooling. Comparing the non-Phase One consent-decree schools to the Phase One schools, the panel argued: "[a]chievement data shows that money by itself often has very little impact. Some schools spent a million dollars or more in supplemental funds without showing improvements" (p. 35). The panel cautioned that it was not implying that money doesn't matter, but rather, that it takes more than money to make a difference.

Ostensibly assessing the "differences" between the implementation phases and citing the 1988 report prepared by James Guthrie and associates, the panel noted that "certain basic features of the Phase 1 approach, *particularly reconstitution,* were not implemented in the other Phases" (p. 36, emphasis added). The panel then concluded that "there is no proof in San Francisco that the provision of large budgets to fund school level plans, *without the reconstitution* and staff development that distinguished Phase 1, will produce any academic benefits for the victims of segregation" (p. 47). From that conclusion, the panel recommended that the District reconstitute targeted schools outside of Phase One, unless they identify and implement other strategies that produce substantial progress. Specifically, the panel recommended "annually reconstituting at least three schools until the task is completed" (p. 56). The panel provided no further guidance as to when and under what circumstances the task will be completed.[10]

According to those close to the Consent Decree negotiations, the plaintiffs in the desegregation lawsuit, particularly the NAACP, subscribed fully to the panel's findings and continued to pursue reconstitution as the solution to low achievement among African Americans and Hispanics. The District and State too agreed that the Phase One reforms should be extended to other failing schools. The only mobilized group that vocally opposed reconstitution – the teachers' union – attempted to intervene in the judicial proceedings, but the Court found that the union had no legal right to join in the consent-decree bargaining. With full agreement of the parties, then, Judge Orrick incorporated the experts' reconstitution recommendations into the Consent Decree (San Francisco NAACP v. SFUSD 1983, Par. 50-a, Exh. 4).

Even accepting the expert panel's conclusions about heightened achievement in the Phase One schools, it is not clear that the evidence fully supported the expansion of all aspects of reconstitution as a remedy. It is particularly not clear that vacating the adults led to heightened

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10 Some have suggested that the panel intentionally left ambiguous the language regarding the completion of the task so that the parties could later negotiate an agreed-upon end to reconstitution.

performance. Our review of the evidence suggests three reasons why vacating the adults may not have been a necessary, or sufficient, element of the success of the Phase One schools.

First, seven other components of the Phase One reforms (as detailed on page 2) may have led to the successful turn-around of the Phase One schools *independent of* vacating the adults, *i.e.*, vacating the adults may not have been a necessary condition for improvement. The experts did not and cannot isolate which of the reforms actually caused the improved achievement in the Phase One schools. Indeed, according to one District administrator, a group of researchers attempted to isolate the cause(s), but was unable to do so. Further research should be conducted to determine the relevant differences between the Phase One and other Consent Decree schools.

This position is further supported by evidence that the Phase One reforms other than vacating the adults may have contributed to improved student achievement:

- Through the package of Consent Decree reform tools, including the positive public relations campaign, dedication to the Philosophical Tenets, and the creation of enriched and magnet programs, certain Bayview-Hunters Point schools, particularly Drew, Burton, and King, were able to attract competitive students from throughout the city – the expert panel said as much (p. 37). Thus, because the panel report did not track changes in individual student performance, any schoolwide achievement gains may well be attributable to the influx of higher performing students and/or the reported "desegregation effect" of mixing low-income minority students with non-minority, middle-class students (Crain & Mahard 1981; Mahard & Crain 1983).

- Students attending certain Phase One schools (including Burton and Mann) and their parents were required to sign a commitment to the schools and the schools' academic objectives (see Guthrie, et al. 1988, p. 39). Such student commitment and parental buy-in may have enhanced the likelihood of success for the student and, consequently, the school. Case study research supports such a proposition (Darling-Hammond 1996, pp. 182-185).

- Only four of the six schools in the Bayview-Hunters Point Area were vacated – the remaining two were brand new schools. Any of the superior performance and achievement gains from Phase One attributable to the new schools – King and Burton – cannot logically be the result of vacating the adults because there was nothing to vacate. In other words, there was, in this case, no organizational failure to remedy. Such superior performance and achievement gains can only be attributed to other factors.

- Apart from the Phase One schools, certain Consent Decree schools improved without reconstitution. According to the expert panel report, ER Taylor and Commodore Stockton – both consent-decree schools and neither reconstituted schools – improved much more than the Phase One schools. One District administrator attributes that success to the strong leadership of the schools' principals. This successful leadership occurred without vacating the teachers from the site.

- According to several sources in the District, prior to implementation of the Consent Decree, Bayview-Hunters Point schools experienced high faculty turnover rates. Plagued by such instability, it is difficult to say that vacating the adults solved the problem. It is easier to say that building a cohesive team under the Philosophical Tenets improved stability and enhanced performance.

Thus, there currently is no clear evidence that vacating the adults was necessary to enhancing student performance. On the other hand, we also want to be clear that there is no conclusive evidence that it was not a necessary part of the Phase One reforms.

Second, there is evidence showing that vacating the adults alone, without implementing the other Phase One components, may not lead to improved school performance. That is, vacating the adults may not have been a sufficient factor in Phase One success. Specifically, vacating the adults failed to improve student achievement in James Lick Middle School and John Muir Elementary School. Both Lick and Muir were vacated, but have ended up being targeted for potential reconstitution again (Orfield, et al. 1992; Rojas 1996). Granted, Lick's failure, at least in the early stages, may have been due to its having to change facilities twice in two years, but such early difficulties should have been ameliorated by now. Thus, as the District itself acknowledges, vacating alone does not improve student achievement.

Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, reconstitution was expanded as a remedy for failing schools in San Francisco without a firm understanding of the educational illness in the first instance. Was it an organizational "culture of failure" in the Bayview-Hunters Point schools? Organizational inertia and the inability to adapt to environmental changes? A lack of support and resources from the District and State? Reconstitution as a remedy assumes internal organizational failure. Before plunging into such a dramatic remedy, a better and documented understanding of the major source(s) of failure seems warranted. This better understanding seems to undergird the District's subtle shift in the theory of reconstitution as a policy – a shift from reconstitution as remedy to reconstitution as both remedy and incentive.

Reconstitution as Remedy AND Incentive for School Improvement: Shifting Gears

Bound by the Consent Decree's requirement to reconstitute at least three schools per year, the District continued after 1992 to use reconstitution as a remedy for school failure. However, in 1993, the District instituted the Comprehensive School Improvement Program (CSIP), a probationary status for low-performing schools that provides them with an incentive to improve

and thus avoid reconstitution. This section sets forth the theory of reconstitution both as an incentive for improvement and a remedy for failure, and discusses its application in CSIP.

Theory of Action: Reconstitution as Incentive and Remedy

Incentives are ubiquitous in organizational life. Employers use a variety of incentives to induce performance among workers, including pay, promotions and working conditions. Likewise, parents and teachers sometimes offer rewards and threaten punishment to motivate certain behavior among children (Kohn 1993). All incentives operate from an assumption of ability and an assumption of rationality. That is, those offering the incentives expect that the subject *can* achieve the desired goal (Cohen 1996) and that the subject *will* respond in a way consistent with the desired goal (Cibulka & Derlin 1996).

In the context of low-performing organizations (such as schools on probation), the theory suggests that such organizations can and will adapt to changing environmental incentives and halt their own decline. So, if a school district changes its demands on schools, requiring them to examine student achievement data and devise ways to improve student learning, schools can and will alter their behavior to meet those new expectations.

According to this theoretical perspective, organizational decline has external as well as internal roots. The support provided to the organization and the incentives guiding it result in inefficiencies (Whetten 1988). New incentives and new support can therefore motivate organizations to remedy internal dysfunction and generate improvement, again assuming the rationality and ability of internal actors. In essence, organizations are adaptable.

Our research suggests that, with the advent of CSIP in 1993, the District believed that schools could reform themselves if given additional assistance from the central office and if told that failure to improve would result in reconstitution. At the same time however, the District began (under court order) to reconstitute three schools per year, suggesting that the District continued to view failure in *some* schools as the product of intractable and internal organizational failure. Reconstitution was therefore still believed to be needed as a remedy despite CSIP.

Theory Applied: The Comprehensive School Improvement Program and Reconstitution

The District launched the Comprehensive School Improvement Program (CSIP) in 1993 to identify low-performing schools and provide a set of resources and support before determining whether to reconstitute the school. As it has been applied in San Francisco since 1993,

reconstitution seeks to remedy organizational failure in all District schools, rather than organizational failure in just the previously racially segregated schools. In theory, then, reconstitution operates *first* as a motivating force for schools undertaking the CSIP process to set priorities and improve student achievement with their existing personnel. In the absence of demonstrated improvement, reconstitution then operates as a remedy for school failure.

The CSIP/reconstitution process has four distinct components (see Attachment D for a more comprehensive description of CSIP):

1. *Identification of low performing schools:* Each Spring, the District calculates an index of performance for each school based on indicators of student characteristics, school characteristics, and student performance. Once it ranks schools on the index, the District chooses those schools with the lowest performance to enter CSIP.
2. *Provision of resources and support:* CSIP schools have access to a set of supports to assist in their improvement efforts. These supports include an "administrative liaison" from the central office who spends at least two days a week at the school, discretionary resources, a guarantee that schools will see no decline in categorical funding and will have flexibility in their budget decisions, and access to management consulting services.
3. *Evaluation of schools' improvement:* The District evaluates CSIP schools on an index, agreed to by CSIP principals and District staff in the first year of implementation, that equally weights a set of quantitative variables and a set of qualitative variables. In accordance with the Consent Decree, the Superintendent recommends three schools for reconstitution each year. Those schools not reconstituted either "graduate" from CSIP, signifying adequate progress in improving achievement, or continue as CSIP schools and undergo another evaluation the following year.
4. *Reconstitution:* Upon notifying a school that it will be reconstituted, the District vacates all the adults in the building and begins a search for a new principal. While the principal is always replaced in reconstituted schools (with the single exception of Mission High School), all teachers from reconstituted schools may re-apply for their jobs.

The shaded portion of Table 1 tracks the interventions in schools entering and leaving CSIP since 1993. In this period, twenty-four schools entered CSIP, including fifteen elementary schools, five middle schools, and four high schools. Nine schools entered in the first year, with

four added in the second year, six in the third year and five in the fourth year; again, the reason for this variable number of entries is the District's effort to keep CSIP participation at 8 or 9 schools with a number of schools leaving the program each year by graduation or reconstitution. Between CSIP's inception and the present, eighteen schools "graduated" from CSIP based on their improvement. The District reconstituted ten schools, including three high schools (Wilson, Balboa and Mission), two middle schools (Visitacion Valley and Aptos), and five elementary schools (Bret Harte, Edison, Rosa Parks, Starr King, and Golden Gate). Two elementary schools – Cleveland and Sanchez – remain in CSIP.

Of the schools targeted by the Consent Decree (marked with a "*" in Table 1), fifteen were either reconstituted as Phase One schools or entered CSIP in the first year of the program. In the second year of CSIP, the District identified another four targeted schools as low performing and placed them in CSIP. That left only six schools for consideration in the ensuing years of CSIP implementation, since the Consent Decree only permitted the reconstitution of targeted schools. Given the practical matter of running out of identifiable schools, as well as findings that significant numbers of low performing African American and Hispanic students attended schools outside of the Consent Decree schools, the parties to the Consent Decree agreed in 1995 to consider all schools in the District eligible for CSIP and for reconstitution. Of the nine schools entering CSIP since that policy change, only one (Golden Gate Elementary School) is a Consent Decree targeted school.

Theory Assessed: Experiencing CSIP and Reconstitution

The theory of "reconstitution as incentive and remedy" posits that the support system of CSIP and the threat of reconstitution can motivate schools to improve. It also posits that if they do not improve, reconstitution will remedy the situation. To assess the validity of this theory, this section will explore the experiences of schools in CSIP and reconstitution since 1993. A range of available sources[11] suggest significant variance in how schools experience the CSIP/reconstitution process. Important distinctions arise with respect to the four aspects of the process outlined earlier: identification, resources/support, evaluation, and reconstitution.

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11 This section draws on, interviews with officials from the District and the United Educators, other confidentially-conducted interviews, including teachers and consultants to the District, an internal report on the first year implementation of CSIP (White 1994), Superintendent Rojas' dissertation (Rojas 1996), policy

Identification: Identifying a school for CSIP draws out sharp emotions among educators and communities. In many cases, teachers and other adults within schools feel a great deal of anxiety, stress, and demoralization, according to both District officials and teachers. One teacher at a CSIP school claimed, "[I] feel that [the] school has been marked for reconstitution since last year." The language used to refer to CSIP schools may contribute to a perception that the probationary period is a brief stop on the way to reconstitution. Some District officials, members of the press, and many other observers refer to CSIP as the "hit list" for reconstitution, connoting a queue for the more drastic sanction.

Exacerbating this perception is the poor relationship that Superintendent Rojas developed with teachers and with the local teachers union, the United Educators of San Francisco. In starkest terms, "[a]s a group, the teachers hate Rojas. That's mostly because of his push for reconstitution, but also because of an authoritarian management style that, they complain, makes them recipients of the process rather than participants" (Davis 1996). In some public statements and in interviews, Rojas demonstrates little sympathy for the plight of educators and administrators in low-performing schools: "The fun part [was to] call these schools in that we had shown on the indicators had weaknesses, and to see them handle it." Interestingly, in his writings, Superintendent Rojas recognizes the severity of the policy's message: "The CSIP approach was drastic, but certainly much more benevolent than the recommendation to reconstitute three schools per year through an arbitrary selection process" (Rojas 1996, p.22).

In response to the distress some schools experience, the District official who oversaw the program until last year routinely attended faculty meetings at CSIP schools to address the loss of hope that tends to accompany the announcement that a school will enter CSIP. One of her goals in undertaking this task was to convince teachers and others in the school that reconstitution is not an inevitability for CSIP schools. In other schools, staffs and especially administrators view the threat of reconstitution as a challenge to overcome, though they must "beat the odds" to do so (White 1994). Rojas summarizes the experience of one successful CSIP school:

> Sandy Leigh, principal of Alvarado Elementary School, said that members of the faculty and staff expressed disappointment and some anger at the time when the school was identified for the program. She also said that their participation in CSIP provided the

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documents and achievement data documents from SFUSD, and journalistic accounts of reconstitution (Ruenzel 1997; Asimov 1996; Davis 1996).

> pressure needed to build strong bonds and make honest and assertive commitments for school improvement. Alvarado was one of the two schools which made significant improvement from spring 1993 to spring 1994 and was given the opportunity to be released from the program (Rojas 1996, pp. 145-6).

However, the line between "challenge" and "threat" is a blurry one among schools identified for CSIP. One District administrator, for example, characterizes the CSIP process as a direct threat to principals. They are encouraged to participate in the process and their failure to do so will result in the loss of their job: " This is kind of like, 'How do you want to get shot? How do you want to be executed?'"

Resources/Support: Under CSIP, the District provides an administrative liaison, preferential treatment regarding discretionary resources, the guarantee that funding will remain the same, and consulting services. Our claim here is not that the CSIP schools receive sufficient support to become high performers (indeed it might be impossible to determine what would produce high performance). The point is that they received more resources than they would have had they not been in CSIP. Among the concerns that principals raise about CSIP, insufficient assistance is not one of them.

When a school graduates from the program, the expectation is that it can maintain its gains without the support, since it has developed the discipline and long-term strategies to continue to improve. Some principals report difficulty accessing District resources once they leave the CSIP program, and this hinders their ability to move the improvement process forward. When CSIP was initiated, the District permitted schools to remain in the program voluntarily. However, to avoid overextending the program's capacity, only identified failing schools can now access CSIP resources and assistance. The fact that principals wish to keep their schools in the program but cannot suggests two possibilities: (1) that CSIP may not ensure self-sufficiency among its graduates, and/or (2) "regular" schools in the District receive insufficient support.

Evaluation: The evaluation panel for CSIP consists of three upper-level District officials (Superintendent Rojas, Deputy Superintendent Davis, and Assistant Superintendent Harrington) and a consultant to the District (Hoover Liddell). These four visit the school once during the year, spending one hour walking through the building and talking with personnel and students. The panel devotes a second visit to hearing a one-hour presentation by the school outlining plans for improvement. Members of the panel do not provide guidance following their visit, they do not

give feedback on the presentation, and they make their qualitative judgments without any further investigation. The lack of feedback and guidance from the evaluators is deliberate. District officials contend that it lends objectivity to the evaluation process by not directly influencing the school's actions during the year.

However, as a result, decisions to reconstitute schools stem from a relatively limited amount of qualitative information (along with quantitative data) gathered in the site visits and school presentations. For example, the Superintendent describes his own experience evaluating CSIP schools in this way: "This is not a one hundred percent science of judging excellent teaching. I saw what I thought were some excellent teachers for the forty five minutes I saw them today [during an evaluation visit to a CSIP school]. That doesn't mean that the next 45 minutes would have guaranteed that." Another member of the evaluation team says it is usually clear whether a school is on the right track from the moment he enters a building. A third says that visits to a limited number of individual classrooms are indicative of activities throughout the school.

Our research suggests that the evaluation process is not viewed by school personnel as a learning process and is viewed by many as unfair. For instance, teachers sometimes refer to these visits pejoratively as a "driveby." Further, the ability of a school to get its act together and make a clear, organized presentation heavily influences the evaluation in general. As a result, schools tend to emphasize school safety and aligning organizational practices (such as scheduling), rather than instructional matters.

Reconstitution: Just as identification for CSIP is often characterized by a sense of demoralization among teachers and others in schools, the decision to reconstitute schools has a profound impact on a school community. Teachers, in particular, often feel *personally* blamed when a school is reconstituted, even though the District claims to be addressing what it considers an organizational and cultural problem. After her school was reconstituted, one teacher described the experience this way:

> I was at loose ends completely. I was completely devastated that I could work for a district for 27 years, have nothing but outstanding evaluations, write five grants, be elected to I don't know how many different committees at the school, be voted nicest teacher I can't even count the number of times, and I was totally dispensable as far as the district was concerned. I felt like the Rojas administration became my enemy, not my support at all.

This teacher was quickly hired by a principal at another school.

The NAACP, plaintiff in the 1982 lawsuit that resulted in the Consent Decree, has always been very outspoken about teachers being the cause of low achievement by African-American and Hispanic students. In a 1996 interview, for example, Lulann McGriff, long-time head of San Francisco's NAACP chapter, stated,

> The reality is that you have a lot of teachers in the district who were never wedded to teaching those (African-American and Hispanic) students. And very few of them live in this city or even care about this city. So you've got teachers who were trained 30 years ago to teach certain types of students who no longer exist in this district (Asimov 1996).

Whether or not some, all, or no teachers meet McGriff's description, it is an opinion which ascribes blame to *all* teachers. In an interview, Superintendent Rojas echoed this, indicating that many experienced teachers were trained with the wrong theories and have the wrong beliefs about low income children of color, which precludes student success.

In addition to the demoralization of many teachers, reconstitution has a significant effect on the staffing patterns of affected schools. The Superintendent has consistently made known his preference for "newness," asking principals not to hire back a large number of teachers from a pre-reconstitution staff. Despite the desire of some principals to hire back a number of staff members, the staffing patterns reflect the Superintendent's preference. Consider a sampling: prior to reconstitution, Rosa Parks Elementary School had 17 tenure-track teachers[12]; of these, 2 were rehired. At Edison Elementary School, 3 of 24 were rehired; at Visitacion Valley Middle School, 2 of 25 were rehired; and at Bret Harte Elementary, 10 of 23 were rehired. With the exception of Bret Harte, which appears to be an outlier, only 8 to 10 percent of teachers were rehired to these reconstituted schools.

By and large, these relatively veteran teachers are replaced with new, young, inexperienced teachers. Edison Elementary School, reconstituted in 1995, is staffed 65 percent by long-term substitutes (LTSs). At Balboa High School, reconstituted in 1996, 64 percent of teachers are LTSs and 24 percent have waivers.[13] At Aptos Middle School, also reconstituted in

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12 "Tenure-track" encompasses tenured and probationary teachers, excluding long-term substitutes (see below).

13 "LTS" is an SFUSD contractual term, and is what is usually referred to by the state as a temporary contract; LTS teachers may or may not have a teaching credential, including an emergency credential. Emergency

1996, 70 percent of teachers are LTSs and 15 percent are on waivers. Starr King Elementary, reconstituted in 1996, has 62 percent of teachers on LTS status and 8 percent teaching with waivers. When one looks at the numbers, especially of teachers with waivers, there is an enormous amount of inexperience, which raises questions about educational quality.

In addition, questions are raised about the stability of reconstituted schools if they rely heavily on new teachers. The National Center for Education Statistics (1997) estimates that, nationwide, approximately 30 percent of beginning teachers leave the profession within five years. While SFUSD does not maintain systemic tracking data for personnel, the national figures suggest a correlation between high numbers of new teachers and high levels of staff turnover. Anecdotal evidence from San Francisco does support the high degree to which new teachers struggle, burn-out, and leave.[14] At the same time, however, not all agree that reconstitution leads to instability. One principal has noted that the ability to hire a fresh staff through reconstitution has created greater school-level stability.

Inexperienced teachers in low-income schools is a common and familiar pattern in public education. Those teachers who have the seniority to teach where they want stay as far away as possible from the "worst" schools, leaving these schools to hire the least experienced of teachers. The result is that the schools most in need of skilled teachers are least likely to get them, as they become places for new teachers to go to *get* experience and then leave. In San Francisco, the "worst" schools are public knowledge – they are in CSIP or have been reconstituted. In particular, skilled teachers who have already gone through reconstitution once are perhaps least likely to consider facing the process again.

Ironically, both the District and the Court recognize the importance of having experienced teachers on a school staff. One of the indicators the District uses to identify school failure and determine whether or not a school should be put in CSIP is the *percentage of LTSs and new teachers to the school* (see Attachment B). Likewise, one of the original Consent Decree indicators to determine which schools would be targeted was high staff turnover, and a stated

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credentialed teachers have passed the California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST) and have met minimum subject area competencies, but have not completed a teacher training program. Waivers are granted by the state to teachers who have not passed the CBEST or do not meet minimum subject area competencies, or both (California Commission on Teacher Credentialing).

[14] In San Francisco new teacher flight has been compounded by the district's wide use of the LTS status, which leaves new teachers without contracts or summer benefits indefinitely.

goal of the Consent Decree was stable schools (Consent Decree 1983). This makes it all the more puzzling that the Superintendent and the District believe that reconstituted schools need new, young teachers.

Some principals bemoan the absence of experienced teachers and make recruiting them a priority. John Flores is the principal of Visitacion Valley Middle School, considered by the District to be a successful reconstituted school. He notes that after reconstitution, "it was a real problem to find experience, though I was finally able to bring in some good older teachers – and that was essential" (Ruenzel 1997). Some teachers who lost their positions due to reconstitution have been courted by principals at previously reconstituted schools who are desperately trying to find some experienced staff members. Likewise, at many reconstituted schools, teachers not originally rehired have been recruited and brought back in subsequent years, although some refuse to return after going through the ordeal of reconstitution. The prior president of the teachers' union noted that the new teachers are not necessarily poor teachers, but that the reconstituted schools are struggling because *all* the teachers are new. Supporting these beliefs, principals of Phase One schools hired many young teachers, but they also recruited veteran teachers to serve as mentors.

The impact of these staffing patterns are not limited to reconstituted schools, but rather have diffused throughout the District in a couple of ways. To begin with, LTSs at any non-reconstituted school in the District can be bumped out of their positions by tenured teachers. Schools that may be neither in CSIP nor reconstituted nonetheless must absorb the tenured teachers removed from reconstituted schools. In many cases, an LTS meets a need of the school and students, such as bilingualism, that the tenured teacher the school is forced to take does not. This type of instability also makes it extremely difficult to create or maintain a professional community of teachers. One consultant who has worked with the middle schools restructuring project points out that a big focus of that project has been teaming. But developing a cohesive team of teachers that collaborates well together around a common vision may take four to five years; if several or even one member of the team is an LTS who may not be at the school beyond June, the process is negatively affected and slower. Finally, without wide scale research, there is no way to assess the possible impact that reconstitution has had on the decisions of teachers districtwide to seek jobs elsewhere or take early retirement, as 400 teachers are doing this year.

Some results of a District policy that does not reflect a belief in teachers as professionals, and the subsequent low teacher morale, are intangible and difficult to trace.

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Considering the experiences of reconstituted schools and schools in the CSIP program, some general themes emerge about the policy of reconstitution in San Francisco. First, evidence from the initial implementation of reconstitution indicates that it is unclear which aspects of the policy generated improved student performance and that vacating alone did not do so. Second, the policy of reconstitution has had a decisively negative impact on teacher morale and teachers' relationship with and trust in the District. Third, the policy has had the consistent and pervasive effect of dramatically reducing the presence of experienced teachers among the professional staffs at reconstituted schools, and increasing instability in the District. Finally, with respect to all aspects of the policy – identification of schools for CSIP, resources/support, evaluation and reconstitution, – it appears that the District's strategy for encouraging schools to improve on their own is too tightly linked to the more severe action of reconstitution. As a result, what should be a distinct tool for school improvement (CSIP) has come to be more a part of the District's accountability system. In the eyes of many observers and participants, CSIP and reconstitution are part and parcel of the same accountability process, which is characterized by the vacating of schools to root out organizational failure (Rojas 1996). As a result, some educators and observers view CSIP as an insincere process, less concerned with real improvement than with identifying schools for reconstitution.

The Foundation of Accountability and Reconstitution in San Francisco

The Foundation of Accountability: Expectations and Reciprocity

Both as an incentive and as a remedy, reconstitution now operates as an accountability mechanism for low-performing schools in San Francisco. Using an extensive set of indicators of school quality and performance, the District makes judgments about the future of individual schools and of staffs within those schools. Given the terms of a judicial desegregation decree rare in its focus on the academic achievement of African-American and Latino students, the District's judgments carry unusually high stakes for schools.

Indeed, the Court spurred the District to implement an accountability mechanism that deviates significantly from the conventional ways in which American schools are held accountable.

Typically, states (and the federal government) require school districts to "give account" for the material inputs of schooling (Wagner 1989) as justification for expenditures directed to those school districts. Thus, school districts are accountable to these higher levels of governance for demonstrating proper use of resources and for structuring schools in compliance with laws and regulations (e.g., running schools for a minimum of 180 days per year or staffing schools with properly licensed teachers).

In addition to having to abide by this traditional conception of accountability, the San Francisco Unified School District is also directly accountable to the United States District Court for desegregating its school system and for raising the achievement of African-American and Latino students. Not only must the District *give account* for its use of Consent Decree funds, it must *answer* for the performance of particular ethnic groups of students. Further, by specifying the reconstitution of failing schools as the instrument by which to improve the achievement of those students, the Court required individual schools to answer for the performance of their students.

These shifts toward focusing on individual schools as accountable units and toward using student performance as the basis for judgments reflect recent policy developments throughout the nation. Nearly every state and numerous local school districts (including large urban districts) now collect and report data on student achievement and attainment, sometimes elaborating rewards and sanctions for levels of absolute performance or for improvement towards performance targets. Writing about state-level policy systems, Elmore, Abelmann and Fuhrman dub this trend "the new educational accountability" and characterize it as an effort to "focus attention less on compliance with rules and more on increasing learning for students" (1996, p. 65).

The new educational accountability is, by and large, a state phenomenon, often bypassing school districts as areas of concern to focus on the need for individual schools to meet state expectations for student performance (Elmore 1996). Such an emphasis is curious for a number of reasons: a strong tradition of local control in American education has long given local school districts policy-making authority and, in some cases, autonomy (Wirt and Kirst 1992); districts have been shown to be an important mediating force in implementing state education policy (Spillane and Thompson 1997); and districts as jurisdictions are often targeted to resolve political and legal disputes (such as desegregation lawsuits) (Wirt and Kirst 1992).

The role of school districts in performance-based accountability systems certainly merits greater attention. More generally, given the role of districts in establishing and interpreting education policy and in order to effectively assess reconstitution, we need to understand what an effective system of accountability would look like at the district level. Recent thinking about educational accountability points to two essential characteristics: (1) upgraded expectations for students and teachers and (2) reciprocity. This section of the paper explores these two ideas and uses them as a basis for understanding the impact of reconstitution on professional educators and students in San Francisco.[15]

Upgraded Expectations

Perhaps the most profound shift in the public discourse about American education in recent years is the recognition that the vast majority of children possess the intellectual ability to learn at high levels and need to do so in order to become productive citizens.[16] Such thinking is reflected in the efforts of numerous states, school districts and professional organizations to develop standards delineating the knowledge and skills that all students should learn in the course of their schooling.

Performance-based accountability begins with the premise that the content and structure of schooling must shift in order that students can meet these upgraded expectations. All children, in essence, are entitled to have adults hold high expectations for them. Though often stated in

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[15] We recognize that any effective educational reform policy, including an effective accountability system, aimed at creating high student performace may include many other components including public engagement. Incorporating communities, parents, and students in the reconstitution process has been a particular challenge for the District. Put simply, such community, parent, and student involvement has been implemented on an ad hoc and non-systematic basis depending upon the willingness of the individual school site to seek such involvement. For instance, Visitacion Valley Middle School, after being reconstituted, engaged in a concerted effort to involve its community by becoming a Beacon School site, a Healthy Start collaborative, and an SB65 program to address pupil motivation and dropout prevention. Early indications at Visitacion Valley point to the partnership of parents, students, and community members as instrumental in reforming the school organization and improving student learning. Contrast Visitaction Valley with Mission High School, which was reconstituted in the face of community opposition. In fact, prior to Mission's reconstitution, more than 200 students, graduates, faculty, and neighbors of the school turned out at a District board meeting to express their strong objection to the possibility of reconstitution. This evidence suggests that reconstitution, indeed any effective accountability mechanism, may well benefit from a more systematic approach to community, parent, and student involvement.

[16] So well accepted is this notion that Congress specifically made it part of its findings for the 1994 Title 1 amendments. According to Congress, those amendments "build[] upon the following learned information: . . . All children can master challenging content and complex problem solving skills. Research clearly shows that children, including low-achieving children can succeed when expectations are high and all children are given an opportunity to learn challenging material." 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997).

rather prosaic terms – such as the oft-cited mantra "all children can learn" – the insight is a profound departure from widely-held beliefs about differences in human capacity and intelligence (Gould 1981).

Believing that all students *can* learn and perform to certain standards is paralleled by a belief that all teachers *must* perform to certain standards. "The success of [the reform] agenda turns ultimately on teachers' success in accomplishing the serious and difficult tasks of *learning* the skills and perspectives assumed by new visions of practice and, often, *unlearning* practices and beliefs about students or instruction that have dominated their entire professional lives" (Darling-Hammond and McLaughlin 1996). Proposals to hold teachers responsible for student learning abound (e.g., merit pay) (Cohen 1996). Indeed, the question of teacher quality lies at the heart of performance-based accountability policy and underlies much of the reform agenda.

Reciprocity

Expectations alone, however, will not likely generate significant gains in educational outcomes for children. As Adams and Kirst suggest: "accountability systems which articulate performance standards and measure schools' progress toward those standards without also attending to the *motivation, capacity,* and *support* which facilitate student outcomes may fall short of expectations" (Adams and Kirst 1998, p.53, emphasis added). Adams and Kirst refer to motivation, capacity and support as attributes of professional educators on whose efforts student learning depends (for discussions of the impact of teaching on student achievement, see Darling-Hammond 1997, Ferguson and Ladd 1996).

Elmore (1996) identifies these same issues as central to the effectiveness of accountability systems, though he quite usefully considers them part and parcel of a broader conceptual construct: *reciprocity*. Holding educators responsible for student learning is conditional on the reciprocal commitment of administrators and policy-makers in school districts to provide the support and resources necessary for learning to occur. Teachers cannot improve student learning on their own. At the heart of reciprocal accountability is the notion that administrators and bureaucrats must, like teachers, attend to the core functions of schooling. Specifically, when they propose to up the ante for teachers by raising expectations for student learning, the basic principle of exchange implies that they offer the support and resources necessary to meet those expectations. Drawing on his observations of District 2 in New York City, where administrators

function more in an assistance role than as agents of external control, Elmore suggests that "every demand for increased performance through a formal accountability system should carry an equal reciprocal obligation on the part of the party making that demand to provide the capacity to meet the demand" (1996, pp.26-27).

Establishing reciprocity requires convincing educators that their efforts will translate into their students meeting established expectations. Thus, the expectations themselves must be consistent with teachers' beliefs (as individuals and as members of a school community) about their students' potential. In Elmore's terms, the goals of the formal accountability system must align with individual teachers' sense of their responsibility and with collective expectations within the school. If one begins with the premise that expectations must be raised and kept high for all students, the challenge in convincing educators of the validity of those expectations lies in constructing "existence proofs of success" (Elmore 1996).

Even if teachers agree that students must meet challenging expectations, their motivation to strive for those expectations is inextricably linked to the strength of their knowledge base about teaching and learning (see Rowan 1996). They must not only want to do the right thing, but must also know the right things to do. Districts have been notoriously insensitive to this imperative: "Somehow, districts expect to have a full-blown teacher walk through the door just because they have a college education and a credential. Districts have felt no responsibility to make a teacher out of who comes through the door" (Sforza 1991).

An effective accountability system, then, must focus attention on the core processes of schooling, providing teachers with the information and skills they need to improve student learning (Elmore 1996, Wilson 1996). As stated a decade ago in a federal report, "[a]ccountability is a blunt tool unless policymakers, educators, and the public have information that allows them to determine the likely sources of a problem and find clues about how to fix it" (OERI 1988, p.7).

Expectations, Reciprocity, and Reconstitution in San Francisco

The broad constructs of expectations and reciprocity outlined above provide useful criteria for judging the impact of the policy of reconstitution on San Francisco's professional education community and students.

Expectations

In the earlier stages of the Consent Decree, when reconstitution was seen as a remedy for intractable school failure, the emphasis was on the setting of new high expectations for African-American and Latino students. Regardless of the success or failure of reconstitution as a policy for raising student achievement in the District, the Consent Decree did significantly raise the expectations for African-American and Latino students. Reconstitution drew attention to the fundamental question of student achievement, and as such was an enormous departure from the status quo of low expectations for certain groups of students.

More recently, Superintendent Rojas has re-affirmed these expectations, and has set even more ambitious goals for the achievement of African-American students. Last year, he identified the District's top priority to be raising the average achievement of African-American students to the 50th percentile on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills. Despite the District's attention to raising academic achievement, two questions persist with respect to expectations. First, while SFUSD has set high expectations for students, the District relies on norm-referenced standardized tests as its primary measure of student learning. As of this writing, the District still lacks standards communicating what students, in general, should know and be able to do, rendering a meaningful evaluation of student success significantly more difficult. Second, the District lacks both high expectations for teaching and any standard by which to measure teacher performance. Through the policy of reconstitution, the District has instead focused its attention on whole-school performance. Superintendent Rojas writes in his dissertation that "the reconstitution model is designed to create improvements in the organization without blaming failure on the performance of individual staff members" (Rojas 1996). The theory is that teachers who are not currently achieving student success will somehow become good teachers in a different school with a better "culture." The policy simply does not hold individual teachers accountable for their performance; indeed, it does not seek to do so. According to both District and union officials, the District has lacked a defined vision of teacher quality and a mechanism for identifying and addressing teacher performance at an individual level.

Reciprocity

In its decision to require San Francisco to reconstitute three schools a year until the task of improving the achievement of African-American and Latino students is completed, the Court

relied on the success of reconstitution in the Phase One schools. Though no detailed evaluation or delineation of what occurred in Phase One schools exists, there is a general consensus that the District (with the Court's direct prodding) made those schools a priority, providing significant human and material resources. Given the sense of common purpose that characterizes discussions about the Phase One schools, one might view the District's relationship with these schools as approaching reciprocity (though we reserve that judgment until more complete investigations of the Phase One schools are conducted).

The same cannot be said for the implementation of reconstitution and CSIP since the modification to the Consent Decree in 1993. While there is evidence that the District provides resources to CSIP and reconstituted schools, there is also evidence that the District has paid less attention to the motivation and support necessary systematically to translate high expectations into improved performance. For example, by perpetuating a sense of blame on San Francisco's professional education community, reconstitution erodes the trust needed for a reciprocal relationship between these professionals and the District. In several forums – public discourse about low-performing schools, the identification of schools for CSIP, the evaluation of CSIP schools, and the decisions to reconstitute schools – language and actions convey a message of blame, even as the policy purports to focus on fostering school improvement and remedying *organizational* failure. In essence, it sends mixed signals.

Further, by relying heavily on inexperienced teachers in reconstituted schools, the District deviated from the experience of Phase One schools, which balanced new, young teachers with more veteran educators. As a result, the District removed an important source of support for new teachers, and did not remedy this by providing alternate sources of support. As such, reconstitution may have failed to create an environment conducive to high achievement for all students, particularly for African-American and Latino students.

Yes, some schools improved under CSIP and yes, some schools improved after reconstitution. These are no small feats in the context of urban education and they should be lauded. But such improvements appear idiosyncratic and determined largely by the ability of school leaders and staffs to beat the odds, to improve in spite of the District's predictions of failure and without clear assistance and support from the District. An ongoing commitment to improving educational opportunities may require an approach grounded in reciprocal

accountability, whereby the challenges posed to schools are matched by support and commitment from the District.

Toward Reciprocity?: Recent Policy Shifts in San Francisco

In the time since we conducted the bulk of our research, three major policy shifts that speak to our findings have occurred in San Francisco. First, in the Spring of 1997, the District and United Educators entered into a tentative agreement to find alternatives to reconstitution. Second, the District and union are moving forward on a trust agreement established in 1996 to develop a peer support and review program for teachers. Third, the District simultaneously developed a new support system for CSIP and reconstituted schools.

Tentative Agreement

The agreement called for a long-range plan to address failing schools in a cooperative manner and a two-year interim plan, described as a "new CSIP" (Rojas and Shelley 1997). The interim plan centers around the restructuring of low-performing schools through a process whereby existing staff would participate in the development of a research-based improvement plan and would have the obligation to commit to that plan in order to remain on the staff. This concept is not new in San Francisco. The Restructuring Schools Initiative (RSI) was adopted in the 1989-90 school year as the result of contract negotiations, in order to:

> establish a learning community within the San Francisco Unified School District focused on improving student performance by changing the whole school and the whole system... Members of the school community make a commitment to establish a shared decision-making process using consensus, to determine school-wide student and school community outcomes and to work together to achieve these outcomes for all students (Turner 1997).

A main thrust of RSI has been to increase awareness and understanding of the School Site Councils that are required by state law. The current tentative agreement, in its call for and move to a site-based decision making model, builds on this RSI work.

The long-range plan, which theoretically must pass muster with the parties to the Consent Decree (Fraga, Anhalt and Lee, 1998), remains to be crafted.[17] The agreement did, however,

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[17] In June, the United Educators drafted a "conceptual framework" for the long-range plan. It calls for a cycle of school improvement that *targets* low-performing schools, builds school capacity to minimize *trauma*, enters a *truce* among school community members to put aside their differences, develops *trust* through work toward a common goal, allows for a *transition* based on data analysis and planning, and engages school community members in the *transformation* of the school culture ("Conceptual Framework for Developing an Alternative to Reconstitution," an unpublished proposal from UESF, June 4, 1997).

suggest the implementation of a peer assistance and review process modeled after other districts (what is commonly known as the Toledo Plan) and the inclusion of a parent component.

Trust Agreement

In February 1996, UESF and the District entered into a trust agreement to establish a two-year pilot peer support and review program. A "trust agreement" is a binding agreement used to establish programs which fall outside the scope of mandatory bargaining, and is sometimes viewed as a first step towards a potentially reciprocal relationship (Kerchner and Koppich 1996). Peer review programs vary, but typically provide mentorship to all new teachers in the District, and intervention for veteran teachers experiencing difficulty. For teachers in either category, failure to meet specified quality standards results in dismissal from employment in the District.

The SFUSD/UESF trust agreement created the New Teacher Assistance Program (NTAP), which has provided support to 150 new teachers over the last two years. The current trust agreement expires in June of 1998, but is expected to be renewed. The next phase, scheduled for the 1998-99 school year, is the addition of the evaluation component for new teachers. In order to think systemically about teacher evaluation, the NTAP Governing Board has been working this year to develop and adopt District standards for teaching. Intervention for veteran teachers will likely not be included for a couple of years, as this is considered the much more difficult aspect of the program. Eventually, the peer review program may be ratified as part of the union contract.

The work of the NTAP board, indeed the move to peer review, addresses prior failings in the area of expectations and reciprocity. By establishing guidelines for quality teaching and a systematic method for the removal of teachers not meeting these guidelines, high expectations for teachers are set. But as an accountability mechanism, peer review, unlike reconstitution, does not just set standards and then levy consequences when the standards are not met. Through systematic mentorship and support, the peer review policy, if continued, will seek to build the capacity of teachers in order to help them meet the new standards. By beginning the process of providing a system of support, the District is recognizing its share of responsibility for creating quality teachers, and hence quality classrooms. In this way, SFUSD is beginning to address not just expectations but reciprocity.

Support System

While discussions around the tentative agreement continue, the District proceeded to reconstitute two schools – Golden Gate Elementary School and Mission High School. In addition to reconstituting these schools, the District allowed four schools to graduate from CSIP. Further, because of ongoing discussions around the tentative agreements, the District did not identify any new schools to enter CSIP. As a result, only two schools remain on CSIP – Cleveland Elementary School and Sanchez Elementary School (see Table 1). For these schools and for the schools reconstituted in the prior three years[18], the District created a new support system designed to provide ongoing technical assistance to individual principals and to align District policies to meet the needs of these priority schools.

A CSIP/Reconstitution committee – composed of District officials, principals from the nine schools (seven reconstituted and two CSIP), several consultants, and a representative from the United Educators – monitors the progress of planning and improvement efforts in the schools and coordinates resources devoted to the schools. Under the leadership of John Flores, the principal of a school reconstituted four years ago, a subset of the principals convenes bi-weekly to discuss a range of issues, including discussing strategies to complete teacher evaluations in a timely fashion, developing a site plan and school portfolio, and coordinating test preparation efforts. Flores also fields specific requests from the principals and serves as a conduit to obtain resources and services from various District offices. This new support system for principals of reconstituted schools is a recognition that principals, like teachers, need assistance from the District to make high achievement a reality for students. Simply as a way to ease the burden on principals in meeting the complex challenges of their job, the system represents an important step toward reciprocity.

What is ultimately more interesting from an analytical standpoint is the degree to which the kind of relationships that develop between central office administrators and site administrators in the context of this system affects the overall operation of the District. District officials made a "deliberate choice" not to isolate the CSIP/Reconstitution team from the rest of the central office,

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18 These schools are Edison ES, Rosa Parks ES, Starr King ES, Golden Gate ES, Aptos MS, Balboa HS, and Mission HS. Edison and Rosa Parks are in their third year of reconstitution, Starr King, Aptos and Balboa are in their second year, and Golden Gate and Mission are in their first year. Previously reconstituted schools are no longer considered "reconstituted" and thus do not receive assistance under the new support system.

wanting instead for the team to serve as a model for how central office administrators could contribute to the mission of the District. That, of course, is a central tenet of reciprocal accountability and further research will hopefully illuminate the degree to which San Francisco succeeds or falls short in this endeavor.

Summary and Conclusion

Reconstitution in San Francisco is a dynamic policy. We have discussed the changing theoretical bases and effects of the policy since its genesis on legal pleading paper in 1983. Conceived as a remedy for racial segregation and failing schools, reconstitution enjoyed some degree of success in terms of improved achievement among African American students. To which of the many components of the policy success should be attributed is a matter for further research. Nonetheless, we have argued that any success of reconstitution as a remedy cannot be attributed solely to the "vacating the adults" component of the policy, but rather must be attributed to the full panoply or some subset of the Phase One interventions. In addition, we have argued that the very theoretical basis of reconstitution as a remedy – that the source of school failure is internal and irreversible – has shifted in the 1990s.

Under Superintendent Rojas, the District has begun to employ reconstitution as a remedy *and* an incentive to prompt improvement in failing schools. In this dual capacity, reconstitution is the hammer looming behind the school improvement process (CSIP) that failing schools are supposed to employ in an effort to raise student achievement. With the hammer in place, some schools have improved and others have languished in what appears to be an idiosyncratic fashion. Meanwhile, the use of reconstitution has had deleterious effects on San Francisco's teachers – their morale, their relationship with the District, their sense of professionalism – and has reduced the presence of experienced teachers at reconstituted schools, while increasing instability overall. Further, the hammer and CSIP have become to tightly linked in the minds of teachers and the San Francisco community. The result is a school improvement process that is perceived to be doomed from the outset.

Perhaps understanding this disjuncture between theory and perception, the District's administration and teaching staff have again begun to implement a shift in the policy of reconstitution, a shift firmly grounded in higher expectations for students and teachers and reciprocal accountability among the schools and the District. With the addition of these two

aspects of accountability, reconstitution has moved a great distance from its initial function of "cleaning house" and starting afresh. Likewise, other policy efforts by the District reflect a recognition of both upgraded expectations for school professionals and reciprocity in District action. At bottom, reconstitution as a policy and San Francisco as a District have been shaped by their changing environment and their own successes and failures.

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Waldemar Rojas, Superintendent of Schools, San Francisco Unified School District, February 25, 1997.

Joan-Marie Shelley, President, United Educators of San Francisco, February 4, 1997.

Table 1: The Implementation of Reconstitution in SFUSD

	Consent Decree Implementation		*CSIP and Continued Reconstitution*				*"Post"-Reconstitution*
School Name	**1983**	**1988**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**
*G. W. Carver ES	R						
*Charles E. Drew ES	R						
*Malcolm X ES	R						
*M. L. King MS	R						
*Horace Mann MS	R						
*Burton HS	R						
*John Muir ES		V	C	◊	◊	G	
*James Lick MS		V	C	◊	G		
*Edison ES			C	◊	R		
*Rosa Parks ES			C	◊	R		
*Alvarado ES			C	G			
*Leonard Flynn ES			C	G			
*Bret Harte ES			C	R			
*Visitacion Valley MS			C	R			
*Marshall HS			C	R			
*De Avila ES				C	◊	G	
*Potrero Hill MS				C	◊	G	
*Glen Park ES				C	G		
*Webster ES				C	G		
Sanchez ES					C	◊	◊
Denman MS					C	◊	G
McAteer HS					C	◊	G
Starr King ES					C	R	
Aptos MS					C	R	
Balboa HS					C	R	
Cleveland ES						C	◊
Fairmount ES						C	G
Marshall ES						C	G
*Golden Gate ES						C	R
Mission HS						C	R

* = targeted schools under the Consent Decree (Sanchez and Starr King had "targeted programs")
R = Reconstituted
V = Vacated (staff replaced but other components of reconstitution not implemented)
C = Entered CSIP
◊ = Continued in CSIP (evaluated again the following year)
G = Graduated from CSIP (making sufficient improvement)

Source: San Francisco Unified School District

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Attachment A
The Philosophical Tenets

1. All individuals should learn to live and work in a world that is characterized by interdependence and cultural diversity.

2. All individuals are entitled to be treated with respect and dignity.

3. All individuals want to learn and to be recognized for their achievements.

4. All individuals can learn.

5. All individuals learn in many different ways and at varying rates.

6. Each individual learns best in a particular way.

7. All individuals are both potential learners and potential teachers.

8. Teachers, administrators and staff are partners with students in the learning process. If students fail, all partners should accept full responsibility for this failure and take action to ensure success.

9. Learning has both cognitive and affective dimensions.

10. Learning is an interactive process that occurs when students understand and are able to communicate new concepts through carefully crafted and guided challenging experiences defined by clear learning goals and rigorous performance standards.

11. Parents want their children to attain their fullest potential as learners and to succeed academically.

Source: San Francisco Unified School District, Department of Integration

Attachment B
Indicators Used by the District to Identify Low Performing Schools*

- The percentage of non-LEP students at the school who scored below the 25th percentile on the CTBS Total Battery
- The percentage of teachers at the school who were assigned to the school after July of the previous year or who were long term subs.
- The number of students assigned to the school who requested open enrollment transfers to other schools per 100 students enrolled.
- The number of students assigned to the school who requested open enrollment transfers to the school per 100 students enrolled.
- The number of students at the school referred for SARB review per 100 students enrolled.
- The number of students at the school who were suspended per 100 students enrolled.
- The percentage of possible student attendance days for which students were in attendance or had excused absences.
- The percentage of students enrolled at the school at any time during the year who have dropped out.
- The total school budget divided by the number of students enrolled.

* Originally, 17 indicators were tracked by the District in order to identify schools for CSIP. That number was pared to nine in order to target those indicators over which schools were seen to have some measure of control.

Source: San Francisco Unified School District

Attachment C: Consent Decree Implementation

Phase	Start Date	Schools	Year Entering CSIP	Year Reconstituted
1	2/1/84 for elementary schools	1. George Washington Carver ES		1984
		2. Charles E. Drew ES		1984
		3. Malcolm X ES		1984
	7/1/84 for middle/high schools	4. Martin Luther King MS		1984
		5. Horace Mann MS		1984
		6. Burton HS		1984
	2/1/86	7. James Lick MS	1993	1988 (vacated)
2		8. Potrero Hill MS	1993	
		9. Vis Valley MS	1994	1994
	7/1/86	10. Rosa Parks ES (Raphael Weill)	1993	1995
3		11. Alvarado ES	1993	
		12. De Avila ES	1994	
		13. Glen Park ES	1994	
		14. Golden Gate ES	1996	1997
		15. Comm. Stockton ES		
		16. Taylor ES		
		17. Thurgood Marshall HS (Wilson)	1993	1994
		18. Galileo HS		
	1/30/89	19. Edison ES	1993	1995
4		20. Leonard Flynn ES	1993	
		21. Bret Harte ES	1993	1994
		22. Webster ES	1994	
	9/4/90	23. John Muir ES	1993	1988 (vacated)
	2/1/93	24. Twenty-First Century ES		
Other				
	7/1/95	25. Gloria Davis MS		

Source: San Francisco Unified School District

Attachment D: The Process of Reconstitution in San Francisco

The CSIP/reconstitution process has four distinct components: (A) identification of low performing schools, (B) provision of resources and technical support, (C) evaluation of schools' improvement, and (D) reconstitution.

A. Identification

Each Spring, the District calculates an index of performance for each school based on indicators of student characteristics, school characteristics, and student performance. The index is a sum of four separate measures: (1) the number of the District's nine indicators of performance for which a school shows noticeably poor attainment (see Attachment B); (2) an index of educational need for each school[19]; (3) the percentage of the Board of Education's goals and objectives that a school meets (See Attachment E); and (4) the average of a school's five year gain (or loss) in reading and math CTBS scores. The overall index has a range of 0-20, with 20 indicative of the lowest possible performance.

Once it ranks schools on the index, the District chooses those schools with the lowest performance to enter CSIP, excluding those already reconstituted since 1993, those already in CSIP, and those with special circumstances (e.g., alternative schools). There is no established cut-off score on the index. Rather, the District tries to keep the number of schools in CSIP at eight or nine. So, for example, if three CSIP schools are reconstituted in a given year and one school improves enough to leave the program, then the District is likely to identify four new schools for CSIP in the following year. The District informs schools in August regarding their participation in CSIP. As mentioned earlier, the District did not add new schools to CSIP this year. Because four graduated from last year's pool of eight and two were reconstituted, only two schools remain in CSIP.

B. Resources and Support

Once in CSIP, schools have access to a set of supports to assist in their improvement efforts (Rojas 1996, Alvarenga 1996). These supports include the following:

- Each school chooses an "administrative liaison" from a list of central office administrators trained to support schools as they proceed through CSIP. The liaison spends at least two days a week at the school, helping to write the improvement plan, accessing needed resources from the District, and encouraging the school and the community to focus on aligning curriculum, instruction and assessment with the District's goals and expectations.
- CSIP schools receive discretionary resources from the District. District officials characterize this as giving CSIP schools priority over others when resource needs arise.
- The District guarantees that schools will see no decline in categorical funding and will have flexibility in their budget decisions.
- The schools have access to management consulting services.[20]

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[19] The educational needs index is calculated based a set of school characteristics, including the percentage of African-American and Hispanic students, reading performance ranked against other schools in the District, level of poverty ranked against other schools, the concentration of African-Americans ranked against other schools, and the concentration of limited-English proficient students ranked against other schools (Rojas, August 4, 1996).

[20] "Management consulting services" might be better thought of as support for curriculum and instruction. Until this past year, the District connected CSIP schools to consultants in order to meet specific programmatic

Schools may utilize any, all, or none of the resources described here.

C. Evaluation

The criteria used to identify schools for CSIP are summative, gathered at the end of each school year. In order to make timely decisions about which schools will be reconstituted each May, the District must evaluate CSIP schools before all of these data are gathered. Therefore, the quantitative data used to evaluate CSIP schools do not precisely parallel the indicators that place schools in CSIP. Further, in the early development of CSIP, principals asked that the District incorporate qualitative judgments of school performance in their evaluations (White 1994). As a result, CSIP evaluates schools on an index, agreed to by CSIP principals and District staff in the first year of implementation, that equally weights a set of quantitative variables and a set of qualitative variables. Attachment F provides a list of the variables used.

It should be noted that the qualitative data are gather in large part through the observations of a review panel consisting of the Superintendent; Deputy Superintendent Linda Davis; Assistant Superintendent Robert Harrington; and consultant Hoover Liddell. The membership of the panel has been consistent throughout the four years of CSIP's implementation. In their review, the panel spends one hour visiting the school in February and hears a single, one-hour presentation from the school in April. In addition, the schools submit a school portfolio and a site plan for District review.

Similar to determinations for entering CSIP, the evaluation index provides a ranking of schools. District officials recommend reconstitution for those with the lowest performance. Again, no formal cut-off score exists. In accordance with the Consent Decree, the Superintendent recommends three schools for reconstitution each year (in 1995 and in 1997, the District only reconstituted two schools). Those schools not reconstituted either "graduate" from CSIP, signifying adequate progress in improving achievement, or continue as CSIP schools and undergo another evaluation the following year.

D. Reconstitution

The decisions about reconstitution occur each May. Upon notifying a school that it will be reconstituted, the District vacates all the adults in the building and begins a search for a new principal. Hired in early Summer, the principals are given until the beginning of the school year to recruit and hire a new staff as well as develop a site plan.

While the principal is always replaced in reconstituted schools (with the single exception of Mission High School), all teachers from reconstituted schools may re-apply for their jobs. However, the Superintendent has consistently made known his preference for "newness" in reconstituted schools. Considering schools in need of reconstitution to be suffering from a dysfunctional culture, he calls on principals to hire back only a few teachers from the prior staff.

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needs, such as finding and implementing a reading program. Recently, a particular consulting firm (Education Partners) began providing more systematic support to CSIP schools.

Attachment E
San Francisco's Goals

1. To improve teaching and learning to enhance the academic achievement of all students, and thereby to improve teaching and learning for all.

2. To improve staff, parent and community participation in the educational process and thereby to improve teaching and learning for all.

3. To maintain school environments that are safe, secure and attractive, and thereby to improve teaching and learning for all.

4. To build a school environment that is fully integrated in all its programs and activities and provides equal opportunity for all students, and thereby to improve teaching and learning for all.

5. To improve and expand the Early Childhood Education Program and integrate it into the K-12 Program.

6. To increase and expand inter-agency collaboration to better serve our students.

For Goals 1-4, the District identified multiple objectives for schools. These goals and objectives are to be incorporated into school site plans, which must be developed annually.

Source: *Common Expectations for All Schools: 1995-96*, San Francisco Board of Education

Attachment F
Criteria Used to Identify Schools for Reconstitution

1. Quantitative areas:

- Historical trends (over the past four years) in student achievement;
- CLAS writing sample in September and January of CSIP year;
- Alternative assessment as it exists at each school site;*
- ADA for the Fall semester of the CSIP year shall meet standard set in the District Goals and Objectives (97.5 or above);
- Student suspensions shall meet standards set in the District Goals and Objectives (3.5 per 100 at elementary, 8 per 100 at the secondary level);
- Reductions in the number of D, F and I grades given out (applies to middle and high schools);
- Drop out rates shall meet standards set in the District Goals and Objectives (2.5 per 100); and
- Student Placement referrals.

Each of these is worth 12.5 percent toward the overall quantitative rating of the school.

2. Qualitative areas:

- Review of the One Site Plan indicates approval by all departments, activities that are being implemented and effective and which focus on improving academic performance of African American and Hispanic students.
- Visitation to the school indicates a match between the activities of the One Site Plan, the oral presentation and the contents of the portfolio with the realities of the school.
- Review of the school portfolio indicates that it effectively documents the school's program, direction, efforts and plans to improve the achievement of all students, especially African American and Hispanic students.
- Presentation to the Superintendent and review panel effectively communicates the efforts, plans and commitment to improve the achievement of African American and Hispanic Students.

Each of these four areas is worth 25 percent of the overall qualitative rating of the school.

* In practice, this area has not played any role in identifying schools for reconstitution.

Source: Memorandum to CSIP participants from Superintendent Rojas, May 8, 1995